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Migration and Franchise Expansion in Latin America 
 
 
Cristina Escobar 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
Latin America is an interesting region for evaluating migration and the expansion of the 
franchise. Most Latin American countries have enfranchised their non-resident citizens and 
ten have enfranchised their immigrant non-citizen population (see Table 1 below). This 
expansion of the franchise is not new. On the contrary, it corresponds to a long and diverse 
history of Latin America as it transformed from a region of immigration at the turn of the 
20th century to a region of emigration in the last quarter of the same century, including 
periods of intra-regional migration (mid-20th century and early 21st century). This expansion 
of the franchise over a long period has also been accompanied by the countries’ struggles to 
establish more stable democracies. Our interest here is to explore comparatively the general 
questions of why different countries at different times granted voting rights to their 
expatriates and to their foreign residents. A more detailed explanation of the variants of this 
participation (i.e. expatriate participation in presidential versus legislative elections or 
enfranchisement of resident aliens in municipal, regional or national elections) which are 
directly related to internal politics, institutional design, etc., or the actual use of these political 
rights by the newly enfranchised, therefore, falls outside the scope of this report.  
Increased international migration in this era of globalization has challenged the 
traditional limits of the franchise by extending it beyond the territory of the state, in the case 
of the non-resident citizens, and beyond the status of citizenship, in the case of the resident 
aliens (Caramani & Grotz 2015, Arrighi & Bauböck 2016). Parallel discussions have 
developed in the study of each one of these areas of franchise expansion, considering them 
either as responses to new international norms or, on the contrary, as the result of states’ 
internal (judicial, political, etc.) processes. This report is a review of the expansion of the 
franchise in Latin America and an evaluation of the usefulness of these theoretical 
perspectives in making sense of the regional dynamic and seeking possible connections 
between the two dimensions of the franchise expansion.   
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2. The expansion of the non-resident franchise  
 
 
In order to address comparatively the expansion of the non-resident franchise in Latin 
America, it is important to first acknowledge the diversity that characterizes the region. Some 
countries have not adopted any provisions regarding the rights of non-residents to vote in 
elections (Nicaragua, Cuba, Uruguay), while others (e. g.  Colombia 1961) have been 
pioneers not only in the region but also in the world.  There is also significant variation in the 
extent to which these electoral rights for non-residents have been enacted.  The most common 
and widespread case is expatriates’ participation in presidential elections and national 
referendums. However, there also are examples, though much less common, of non-resident 
participation in legislative elections either at the national level (Mexico and Paraguay) or in 
specific overseas districts (Colombia, Ecuador, Dominican Republic and Peru). Finally, there 
are institutional variations, such as federal systems favoring specific forms of regional non-
resident electoral participation (Mexico), which are not an option in other countries 
(Echeverría 2015, Escobar 2015, López 2016, Merino Acuña 2015, Pedroza 2015).  
Scholars have proposed various hypotheses to explain the steep increase in the 
number of countries (now over one hundred), which have adopted the non-resident franchise 
since the 1990s, transforming what was an exceptional occurrence into a widely adopted 
norm. These studies have analyzed whether this increase in non-resident voting rights is the 
result of the emergence of a ‘new international normative standard’ of emigrant inclusion, 
which they have called the ‘global-norm hypothesis’, or, rather, the result of an extension of 
democratization in a larger number of countries, called the ‘contestation hypothesis’ (Lafleur 
2015, Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010). According to the global-norm hypothesis, this 
outcome could be the result of top-down processes, such as the adherence to international 
treaties and conventions, the result of peer pressure or neighbourly emulation (Lafleur 2015, 
Turcu and Urbatsch 2015).  The argument according to which the extension of the franchise 
to non-residents is the result of an extension of democratization has been elaborated by 
Rhodes and Harutyunan (2010), who include two possible explanations or sub-hypotheses 
within this ‘contestation hypothesis’. First, borrowing from other scholars’ analysis of the 
establishment of women’s suffrage, they propose the ‘window of opportunity hypothesis’ and 
argue that regime transitions tend to be inclusive, giving opportunities to sectors that were 
previously excluded by incorporating their specific demands. Second, the ‘democratic-
endurance hypothesis’, which states that competitive regimes or well-established democracies 
extend the franchise to emigrants as a gradual process over time (Rhodes and Harutyunyan 
2010).  
The history of the non-resident franchise in Latin America is long, starting in the 
1960s and extending into the second decade of the 21st century. As has been found in other 
regions, the expansion of the franchise in Latin America is related to democratization, as a 
necessary but not always sufficient condition for emigrant enfranchisement. Other factors 
have been at play but they have changed over time, demanding a periodization of events for 
the analysis of the aforementioned hypotheses. Three periods in Latin America’s 
enfranchisement policies can be identified. The first wave, from the 1960s to the end of the 
1980s, took place in countries that were then transitioning from military to democratic 
regimes. It includes Colombia, which ended its short-lived military regime and enacted the 
non-resident franchise legislation for presidential elections in 1961 and put it into effect in 
1962. Brazil enacted the emigrant franchise relatively early (1965), but it was not 
implemented until after the end of the military regime, when the necessary provisions were 
Migration and Franchise Expansion in Latin America 
RSCAS/GLOBALCIT-Comp. 2017/1 - © 2017 Author 	 3 
adopted (1989).1 Peru enacted this right in the Constitutional Assembly of 1979, after the end 
of the military rule, and it was implemented in 1980 (Durán 2003, Merino Acuña 2015). 
Similarly, in the transition from military to civilian rule in Honduras, a law extended the 
suffrage to expatriates (1981); law that was not implemented until 20 years later (Hernández 
2003). In all these cases, the extension of the franchise to emigrants pre-dates the large 
economically oriented emigration from Latin America that started in the 1980s. The purpose 
of the reform was, at least to some extent, to make political exiles participants in the 
democratization of their countries.  
The contestation hypothesis appears to be the best explanation to account for the 
extension of the non-resident franchise in Latin America during this first period. While the 
window of opportunity sub-hypothesis could also serve as an explanation, there is something 
different about these cases since the reason behind the emigration of those affected by the 
new policies of inclusion, i.e. political exiles, is directly related to the lack of democracy. 
There is a significant element of restitution, even if only symbolic, associated with the 
opportunity to participate that differentiates these cases from those of the following period, 
when emigrants, many of whom left for economic reasons, attained the vote. In this second 
case, emigrants benefited from a window of opportunity and obtained political rights as 
citizens but their departure was not directly related, as in the first case, to a previous lack of 
democracy.  An additional interpretation to this restitution sub-hypothesis is that 
enfranchising non-residents, particularly exiles, was an international signaling of the 
governments’ commitment to democratization. Signaling of democratic norms has been 
considered as a diffusion mechanism for emigrants’ enfranchisement (Turcu and Urbatsch 
2015).  In this first period, the extension of the franchise to expatriates was not accompanied 
by candidacy rights, which only Colombia, among these initial three countries, would enact in 
subsequent years. 
The second period, from the early 1990s to the early 2000s, is also associated with 
democratization, because the extension of the franchise during this period took place within a 
broader democratic transformation that included constitutional assemblies (Colombia 1991, 
Dominican Republic 1994, Ecuador 1998, Venezuela 1999) and constitutional reforms 
(Bolivia 1991, Argentina 1994, Mexico 1996) which were predated or followed by electoral 
reforms. During this decade of the 1990s, seven Latin American countries enacted laws or 
constitutional reforms that extended political rights to their expatriates. Among these 
countries is Argentina (1991), where the approval of the legal project supporting expatriate 
enfranchisement, similar to the ones approved in Brazil, Peru and Colombia after the end of 
military regimes, was delayed for reasons that did not have to do with the project itself 
(Emmerich 2016).  While expatriates were more active in some countries than in others in 
promoting the inclusion of the non-resident franchise, the democratic opening clearly offered 
a window of opportunity for expansion of the franchise (Lafleur 2015). Interesting in this 
respect and supporting this window of opportunity explanation is the fact that while the rights 
were formally included in new constitutions and laws (Bolivia 1991, Colombia 1991, Mexico 
1996, Dominican Republic 1997, Ecuador 1998, Venezuela 1998), these rights were not 
regulated and put in practice until much later, when enough support had been built to 
implement them (Bolivia 2009, Colombia 1997/20012, Dominican Republic 2004, Ecuador 
2006, Mexico 2006) (Escobar 2015). The window of opportunity then allowed these rights to 
be at least nominally enacted, even when the circumstances were not yet ripe.     																																																								
1 The initial law was drafted under a democratic government but was enacted in 1965 by the military regime that 
followed. See Calderón Chelius 2003. 
2 In Colombia the democratization opportunity was used to expand the rights to vote in legislative elections, 
which was not regulated until 1997, for the Lower House and 2001 for the Senate.  
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The window of opportunity is not, however, the only explanation. Mechanisms of 
diffusion seem to have been present, as well. Turcu and Urbatsch (2015: 414) have proposed 
that geographical proximity is an important factor increasing the chances of countries 
enfranchising their non-resident nationals. According to these scholars, the enfranchisement 
of the diaspora can allow competing countries to signal to potential partners or investors that 
they are as committed to democratic norms as their neighbours. This hypothesis does resonate 
within Latin America in the processes just described because elites, in a successive wave 
within the region, provided formal support for the non-resident franchise – signaling to the 
world (and/or to their own diaspora) their commitment to democracy – while delaying 
implementation.  In addition to this mechanism of diffusion, which needs to be explored in 
more detail in Latin America, scholars have also underscored the role of migrants themselves 
as agents of democratic diffusion (Pérez-Armendáriz 2010). There is evidence that emigrants 
themselves became the agents of diffusion of non-resident electoral enfranchisement in Latin 
America. In the 1980s and 1990s, the concentration of Latin American migrants in New 
York, for example, gave Colombians, Ecuadorians and Dominicans opportunities to share 
experiences regarding their fight for dual citizenship and for the external franchise (Jones-
Correa 1998, Escobar 2007). It might even be possible to hypothesize that the resemblance in 
the mode of expatriate representation established in these three countries – which, aside from 
Peru are the only ones to include specific overseas electoral districts in the lower house – is 
due to these diffusion mechanisms.  Hence, by the end of the 1990s, when ten countries had 
extended the franchise to their diaspora, ‘contestation’ was not the only factor accounting for 
this extension. Diffusion, carried out not only by elites but also by migrants themselves, 
became an increasingly important mechanism for the extension of electoral rights to non-
resident citizens in the region.  In recent years, as interregional migration has increased in 
Latin America, cities such as Buenos Aires and São Paulo have also become centres where 
migrants from various South American countries converge, and where some of them (i.e. 
Chileans and Bolivians in Buenos Aires) have carried on struggles for enfranchisement in 
their countries of origin. Studying these Latin American migrant communities and their 
exchanges could enlighten our understanding of the role migrants play in the diffusion of 
these electoral rights.  
The third period in the extension of the franchise to non-resident citizens in Latin 
America extends from the mid-2000s onwards when six more countries enfranchised their 
diaspora (Panama 2006, Costa Rica 2009, Paraguay 2011, El Salvador 2013, Chile 2014 and 
Guatemala 2016). In this period, democratization continues to be a crucial factor explaining 
the expansion of the franchise, as in the previous one, and therefore the contestation 
hypothesis is still a valid explanation. Countries where parties in power, such as El Salvador, 
or conservative parties fearful of the opposition of expatriates from abroad (Paraguay and 
Chile) had limited their enfranchisement, were able to finally give emigrants the vote as 
changes in power took place (Escobar 2007). But democratization was important also 
because, as Lafleur (2015) has pointed out and as was explained above, there were legislative, 
administrative, and logistical obstacles to its implementation besides the formal enactment of 
the non-resident franchise. While some administrative and logistical aspects of this 
implementation might have been independent of the willingness of the parties involved in 
allowing non-residents’ political participation, in other countries, further democratization or 
change in power was necessary to remove those obstacles. Mexico’s constitutional change 
passed in 1996, but it was not until 2006, after a change in the political party in power, that 
Mexicans living outside the country were able to participate in elections for the first time. The 
Bolivian external vote has been included since 1991 in the constitution but was not 
implemented either until 2009, under pressure from the government of Evo Morales, who 
even resorted to a hunger strike (Lafleur 2013).  
Migration and Franchise Expansion in Latin America 
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During this period, emulation continued to be facilitated by immigrant organisations, 
which had, by then, also consolidated in Europe (Cebolla-Boado and López Sala 2015). But 
the new element characterizing this period is an infrastructural within the state, manifested by 
the emergence of specialized state offices serving the non-resident population, which also 
became a platform for policy diffusion among technocratic elites as the officials of these new 
administrations got involved in frequent formal and informal exchanges (seminars, 
workshops, etc.). A pioneer among these specialized state offices in Latin America was the 
Programa para las Comunidades en el Exterior (Program for Communities Abroad), created 
in Mexico in 1990 as part of a new neoliberal approach towards its emigrants. This program, 
linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was transformed into the Instituto de los Mexicanos 
en el Exterior (Institute of Mexicans Abroad) in 2003 and accompanied by the creation of an 
emigrant federal consulting board (Consejo Consultivo) (Guarnizo 1998, Escobar 2006). 
These efforts were followed by similar ones in other Latin American countries, either as a 
result of a state initiative or as a response to non-residents’ demands, during the following 
years, facilitating the technocratic exchanges.3  
The attention now paid by states to their non-resident population, who are becoming 
not only numerically significant but also an important source of foreign exchange through 
their remittances, spurring the creation of these special offices, indicates the presence of new 
factors affecting the expansion of electoral rights. In addition to democratization and 
emulation, which continued to play a role, particularly in Costa Rica and Panama, there are 
also other factors that one can say fall within the global-norm hypothesis. Among these 
factors is the ratification by twelve Latin American countries of the International Convention 
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 
(ICRMW) and the entry into force of this Convention in 2003. Article 41 of this Convention 
states the political rights of migrants in their country of origin, including the right to vote.4 
Ten of the twelve countries that have ratified this convention have also extended the franchise 
to non-resident citizens; among these countries are three of the five that enfranchised these 
citizens during the third period identified here.  
Beyond the existence of the formal international norm, for the diaspora, the right to 
vote from abroad also became a normal expectation. The partisans of the non-resident 
franchise in the public media portrayed it already as an inalienable right that states must 
provide to their citizens.  According to the Panamanian co-president of the International 
Committee for the Vote Abroad (Comité Internacional por el Voto en el Exterior), residing in 
Chicago and fighting at the time for the legislation in Panama (2006): “Suffrage is a right, not 
a privilege. Our country has to relinquish the darkness of the past and join the progressive 
nations that support and respect this principle…for more than 35 years Panamanians abroad 
had been denied this fundamental right to suffrage in spite of their continuous efforts to 
remove this barrier”.5 Similarly, the legislator who proposed the bill that finally allowed 																																																								
3 Among these are the Colombian Colombia nos Une (Colombia Unites Us) program, 2003; the Vice-ministry of 
Salvadorians Abroad, 2004; the Ecuadorian National Migrant Secretary SENAMI, 2007; the Argentinian 
program Provincia 25 (Province 25) from the Ministry of Interior, 2007; and the Dominican National Council 
for Communities Abroad CONDEX, 2008. 
4 Article 41 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families says: 1) Migrant workers and members of their families shall have the right to 
participate in public affairs of their State of origin and to vote and to be elected in elections of that State, in 
accordance with its legislation; 2) The States concerned shall, as appropriate and in accordance with their 
legislation, facilitate the exercise of these rights.  
5 "El sufragio es un derecho y no un privilegio. Nuestro país de origen tiene que despojar las tinieblas del pasado 
y unirse a las naciones progresistas que apoyan y respetan este principio" [my translation] (Panamá América 
(2006).   
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Costa Rica’s emigrants to cast a vote from abroad, Jose Manuel Echandi, explained to the 
media how the absence of this legislation was the cause of what he described as Costa 
Rica’s ‘forced abstentionism’, which he contrasted with the ‘voluntary’ one of those who 
do not make use of their voting rights (La Gente 2009). By 2014, when Chile finally 
approved the non-resident franchise, not only were internal political barriers ultimately 
removed after a long and difficult process of democratic opening, but the global 
organisation of emigrants and their social media campaign counted on two other factors 
working in their favor. First, all South American countries, except for Guyana, Suriname 
and Uruguay (in Central America the exceptions were Belize, Guatemala and Nicaragua), 
had already extended the franchise to non-residents. Second, Chile ratified the ICRWM in 
2005. In their documents and press conferences, the leaders of the Chilean emigrant 
organisation made constant reference to the fact that other nations and the neighboring 
countries had already extended the franchise to non-residents (Comité Internacional Chile 
Somos Todos 2012a). They also mentioned Chile’s violation of the ICRMW and the soft 
pressure exercised by the UN to convince Chile to comply (Comité Internacional Chile 
Somos Todos 2012b). 
 With respect to the approval of the emigrant vote in Latin America, the 
contestation hypothesis, along with the restitution and the window of opportunity sub-
hypotheses, explain the initial phases of its enactment in various countries. By the second 
(1990s) and third periods (2000s onwards), while ‘contestation’ continues to be essential, 
diffusion mechanisms, through expatriates’ and/or elites’ technocratic and neighborly 
emulation, became increasingly significant factors. Finally, by the third period, the global 
norm hypothesis becomes relevant, as a regional norm (the ICRMW) as well.  
 
 
3. Expansion of non-citizen franchise 
 
 
Latin America has a long history of non-citizen enfranchisement, starting with the city of 
Buenos Aires in 1917 and Chile, which allowed foreign residents to vote in all municipal 
elections in 1925. After these early cases, eight more countries have extended the suffrage 
to non-citizens, including Argentina, which extended the non-citizen suffrage to regional 
elections in some provinces in the 2000s and to all municipalities throughout the country 
in 2011 (Emmerich 2014, 2016, Escobar 2015).  
In a theoretical discussion that parallels the one on the non-resident franchise, 
scholars have also examined whether the expansion of non-citizen enfranchisement has 
responded to global/transnational/international factors or to national/domestic ones. The 
national/domestic hypothesis explains the enfranchisement of non-citizen residents as the 
result of state-level factors (citizenship regimes, judicial systems, political party 
competition, welfare regimes, federal versus unitary systems, etc.) that affect in general 
the political incorporation and the extension of rights to new groups within a country.6 
The global/transnational/international hypothesis emphasizes the influence of global 
norms or international treaties, such as reciprocity between countries and their ex-
colonies, that are invoked in support of non-citizen residents and their rights within the 
states. It also includes international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), 																																																								
6 See discussion of these theories in Earnest (2008, 48-50). 
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international organisations and markets, and neighbour countries as agents of norm 
diffusion (Bauböck 2005, Earnest 2008 and 2015, Pedroza 2013).  
 In Latin America, three modalities in the extension of the franchise to non-citizen 
residents can be identified, which broadly correspond to three periods. The first one 
includes Chile, where foreign residents were enfranchised at the municipal level in 1925. 
Even though the scope was different, this modality included also the city of Buenos Aires, 
1917, at the time hosting 49% of the foreign population of Argentina, where non-
naturalised immigrants could vote (Argentina excluded foreigners – as well as women – 
from the “universal” suffrage laws of 1912). These two early cases included in the first 
modality need to be placed within the context of the large European migration to Latin 
America at the turn of the 20th century and the efforts to integrate those immigrants. This 
first modality of the expansion of the franchise can be better explained by the 
national/domestic hypothesis, as Chile and the city of Buenos Aires sought mechanisms 
of political incorporation of immigrants while more general discussions about universal 
suffrage were taking place in each country. In Argentina, enfranchising non-naturalised 
immigrants was a strategy for channeling and controlling the labour struggles in which 
immigrants were very involved. In Chile, with much smaller numbers of immigrants and 
less militancy, enfranchisement was a way to recognize immigrants’ significant 
contributions to the country as merchants, investors and entrepreneurs (Echeverría 2015, 
Emmerich 2014, Escobar 2015). Despite these differences, there are two commonalities: 
first, there is a link between residency and taxation and the right of political participation 
they confer. Second, the scope was limited to the municipality because the nationality of 
origin that European immigrants wanted to preserve was not seen as compatible with 
enfranchisement at the national level. In these early cases, the leverage Europeans had 
had as preferred immigrants over others in Latin American state immigration policies was 
critical in facilitating their enfranchisement. While national factors best explain the 
influence of the political incorporation of these European immigrants at the time, one 
could hypothesize that diffusion also played a role in non-citizen enfranchisement among 
these neighbouring immigrant-receiving countries of Argentina and Chile, which were 
followed few years later by their other neighbour, Uruguay.  
A second and more common modality in the expansion of the non-citizen resident 
franchise in Latin America was present over a long stretch of time, from the 1930s to the 
1990s and includes the cases of Uruguay 1934, Venezuela 1957 (one-time-plebiscite), 
Paraguay 1967, Chile 1980 (expansion to national elections), and Peru 1997. This second 
modality is characterized by the presence of strong authoritarian rulers who resorted to 
the expansion of national constituencies by including immigrants, and in various cases 
women as well, in order to legitimize their regimes (Escobar 2015). In this modality, the 
expansion of the franchise is thus related to the leader’s plebiscitarian interest: In three of 
the five cases (Uruguay 1934, Venezuela 1957 and Chile 1980) non-citizen residents were 
allowed to participate in national elections and not just in municipal ones. This 
participation in national elections is considered an anomaly given that states commonly 
expand political rights to non-citizen residents at the municipal level, where their 
participation and membership does not conflict with the role of citizenship in determining 
membership in the international system of states (Arrighi & Bauböck 2016). As with the 
first modality, the national/domestic hypothesis helps explain this second path towards a 
non-citizen franchise. It is, however, important, once again, to consider that the 
experience of other countries in the region also provided the leaders with examples to 
emulate.    
The third and most recent modality of franchise expansion became more common 
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after 1990 (Colombia 1991, Bolivia 1991, Argentina 1997, and Ecuador 2008) when 
emigration of Latin Americans, mostly to Europe and North America, increased (last 
decades of the 20th century) and when interregional migration directed to countries such 
as Argentina and Chile accelerated (first decades 21st century).Various factors associated 
with the national/domestic hypothesis are still useful to explain immigrant 
enfranchisement within this third modality. First among these is democratization, which 
created an opportunity for the expansion of immigrants’ voting rights, as was also the 
case for the enfranchisement of expatriates discussed in the previous section. Colombia 
and Bolivia are examples of these democratic openings. Second, the accession of 
representatives of the left to power in Argentina and Ecuador, where proposals to expand 
the franchise to immigrants faced initial resistance during the first years after 
democratization, were also crucial (Escobar 2015).  
Even though democratization and the presence of the left were necessary for the 
enfranchisement of immigrants, they are not sufficient to explain its development in this 
third group of cases. Instead, factors associated with the global 
/transnational/international hypothesis are key. Among these factors are, first, emigration 
from Latin America and governments’ concern for the well-being of their expatriates 
overseas. In Bolivia, the law specifically grants suffrage rights at the municipal level only 
to immigrants who come from states that reciprocate by granting Bolivians residing there 
the same political rights (Zegada and Lafleur 2015).  In Colombia, an important argument 
offered in Congress to support the expansion of the franchise to non-citizen residents at 
the municipal level was the principle of reciprocity (Escobar 2015). In Ecuador, where the 
leftist government expanded the voting rights of non-citizen residents to all elections, not 
only municipal ones, under the notion of universal citizenship, there were also 
expectations of reciprocity by governments hosting Ecuadorians overseas (Echeverría 
2015). Given the low number of immigrants in these three countries, reciprocity becomes 
a necessary factor in explaining their interest in expanding the non-citizen franchise. 
These franchise reforms coincide with the signing of reciprocity agreements by Latin 
American states with their former colonial powers Spain and Brazil.7 While in some 
countries (Uruguay and Venezuela), these reciprocity agreements supported rights which 
had already been granted to all immigrants and therefore covered those from Spain, in 
other countries the agreements were critical for the enactment of these rights (Colombia 
and Brazil). Brazil, in fact, restricts participation of non-citizen residents to those holding 
Portuguese nationality (Escobar 2015, Limongi 2016).  
If the significance of emigration and the expectation of reciprocity was an 
important factor for immigrant enfranchisement in countries with low numbers of 
immigrants, in those with a larger influx of immigrants, additional factors were at play. 
The second important factor that supports the global/transnational hypothesis in this third 
modality that started in the 1990s, is the influence of international agreements and 
regional markets (the Andean Community and MERCOSUR).  
In Argentina, which has a large immigrant population and had at the time an 
immigration policy inherited from the authoritarian regime (1976-1983), the signing of 
human rights agreements (the ICRMW)8 and migrant rights’ programs within the regional 																																																								
7 Spain signed agreements with Argentina in 1988, Venezuela in 1990, Uruguay in 1992 and Colombia in 
1992. Portugal signed an agreement with Brazil in 2000. 
8 Article 42 of the ICRMW states  “2. States of employment shall facilitate, in accordance with their national 
legislation, the consultation or participation of migrant workers and members of their families in decisions 
concerning the life and administration of local communities. 3. Migrant workers may enjoy political rights in the 
State of employment if that State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, grants them such rights.” 
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markets, provided the left with important leverage to finally achieve an immigration 
policy reform that gave legal support to the enfranchisement of immigrant residents at the 
municipal and provincial levels. Even though electoral domestic political interests of the 
party in power also influenced the development of these policies, the leverage provided 
by the external global and regional norms was essential for the enactment of these policies. 
Finally, immigrant organisations in countries such as Argentina and Brazil (migrants in 
Latin America now come predominantly from Latin America itself) with links to Latin 
American migrants in Europe, where they have organised in their demands for political 
participation as ‘extra-communitarian immigrants’, have also became a channel of 
diffusion through their struggles for political rights (Escobar 2015).  
The early cases of non-citizen resident enfranchisement in Latin America in the 
first two decades of the 20th century responded to the interests in political inclusion of 
European immigrants who refused to give up their nationality of origin. During the 
following decades (1930s to 1990s), authoritarian rulers enfranchised non-citizen 
residents, in some cases even at the national level, with the intention of enlarging their 
constituency in elections and plebiscites that would legitimize their grip on power. From 
the 1990s on, a new era of expansion of voting rights to immigrants resulted not only 
from democratization and, in some instances, the triumph of the left but also from: a) 
Latin America’s own out-migration and reciprocity sought by governments concerned 
about the rights of their citizens abroad; b) international agreements signed by the states 
while trying to protect their citizens abroad; c) migration policy coordinated within the 
regional common markets; d) regional migrants’ own contacts with migrants in other 
regions of the world. How much the early cases have served as examples to emulate is a 
question for further research. 
 
 
4. Conclusions  
 
 
The examination of the expansion of the franchise in Latin America exposes some 
regional characteristics that define a specific regional path. One characteristic is the 
historically subordinated position these countries have had within the international order, 
first as colonies, then as ex-colonies interested in populating their new countries with the 
“civilizing” Europeans, and later as sources of emigration to the more stable and affluent 
North (North America and Europe). As Stephen Castles has underscored, the meaning of 
citizenship has shifted “from universalism and equality” to denote “a specific position within 
an unequal and hierarchical order of nation-states” (2005, 689). Hence, the subordinated 
position of Latin American countries in the international order has influenced the 
enactment of migrants’ rights, including the franchise, in these countries.  
Governments of two main immigration countries in the early 20th century bent 
their own rules and created mechanisms to politically integrate those European 
immigrants who refused to give up their original nationality. Governments of the many 
emigration countries in the late 20th century not only gave their expatriates the vote, but 
kept them in mind when they enfranchised their foreign residents, expecting reciprocity 
from host states of their diasporas, and when they signed international agreements 
protecting migrant rights.  
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A second characteristic that helps explain the specificity of the Latin American 
path is the struggles of countries in the region with democracy. Ironically, the extension 
of the suffrage to non-naturalised foreigners took place in various cases during 
authoritarian regimes, as dictators searched for legitimation of their regimes in elections 
and plebiscites. However, the return to democracy was also critical for the extension of 
the franchise to non-resident citizens as the new regimes sought the political participation 
of exiles as a fundamental step in the democratic return or at least as an important symbol 
of it.  The transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes and the opening of 
restricted democracies later provided ‘the window opportunity’ for the enactment of 
migrants’ rights, including the vote for expatriates and immigrant residents.  
 A third characteristic, derived from the previous ones but increasingly important, 
is the availability of models to emulate in the Latin American ‘neighbourhood’ – since the 
early 20th century with regard to non-citizen residents and since the 1960s also with 
regard to non-resident citizens. The channels of diffusion have included not only political 
elites and technocrats but migrants themselves who, by the 21st century, counted on 
technology and social media to organise and learn from the experiences of other migrants.   
 The historical analysis of the expansion of the franchise in Latin America reveals 
the predominance of national domestic factors for a good part of the 20th century. Global 
norms, international agreements and regional market policies became significant starting 
in the 1990s. A defining reason for this change is the large emigration from Latin 
Americans to other world regions and the increasing relevance of emigrants for the 
economic and political stability of their countries of origin. In some countries, however, 
such as Argentina, which have lately itself become an important migrant destination (it 
receives now immigrants mostly from their neighbouring countries), the influence of 
these global/international normative factors was undeniable, although it has never meant 
the absence of national factors such as internal politics and democratization, which 
continue to be critical for the expansion of the franchise. Our overall conclusion is 
therefore that domestic and international explanations for the expansion of the franchise 
to non-citizens and non-residents should be considered as complementary rather than rival 
hypotheses. 
 
Table 1. Expansion of Non-resident and Non-citizen Franchise in Latin America 
 
Year Country Non-resident franchise  Non-citizen franchise  
1917 Buenos 
Aires 
(Argentina) 
 City of Buenos Aires 
Law 1.240 of 1917 
 1925  Chile   Municipal elections 
Constitution of 1925, art.104  
1934 Uruguay  All elections and referendums  
Constitution of 1934, art. 67 
1957 Venezuela  (Plebiscite of 1957 only) 
Electoral Law, December 
1957 
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1961 Colombia President 
Law 39 of 1961 (implemented 
1962) 
 
1965 Brazil President  
Law 4737 of 1965 (implemented 
1989) 
 
1967 Paraguay  Municipal elections 
Constitution of 1967 
1980 Peru President and Vice-president 
Constitution of 1979 
(implemented 1980) 
 
1980 Chile  All elections and referendums 
Constitution 1980 
(implemented constitutional 
plebiscite 1980) 
1981 Honduras President  
Political Organizations and 
Electoral Law of 1981, art. 11; 
Decree No. 72-2001 
(implemented 2001), only in 7 
cities in the U.S.  
 
1983 Venezuela  Municipal elections 
Constitutional reform 1983, 
art 111 (implemented 1989) 
1988/99 Argentina  20 Provinces  
1991 Argentina President and Vice-president, 
National Senators and Deputies 
Law 24.007 of 1991 
(implemented 1993) 
 
1991 Bolivia  Municipal elections 
Electoral Law 1246 of July 
1991 Constitution of 2009 art. 
27  
(implemented 2013) Only 
foreigners from countries 
with reciprocity agreements 
1991 Colombia Senate and House 
Representatives for special 
jurisdiction abroad 
Constitution of 1991 
(implemented 1998 Senate, and 
2002 House of Representatives) 
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1991 Colombia  Municipal and district 
elections 
Constitution of 1991 
(implemented 2006) 
1996 Mexico President and Senate  
Constitutional reform of 1996 
art.36.III. 
Federal Code of Institutions and 
Electoral Procedures Sixth Book, 
July 2005 (implemented 2006) 
 
1997 Dominican 
Republic 
President and vice-president 
Electoral Law 275-97 of 
December 1997 (implemented 
2004) 
 
1997 Peru  Municipal elections in non-
border municipalities  
Law of Municipal Elections 
No. 26864 of October 1997, 
art.7 (implemented 1998) 
1998 Venezuela President and Vice-president 
Constitutional reform of 1998 
(implemented 1998). Only legal 
residents of the host country 
 
1998 Ecuador President and Vice-president 
Constitution of 1998. 
National Assembly Members, 
Abroad Assembly Members (6) 
National Referendums  
National Constitution of 2006 
(implemented 2006) 
 
1999 Venezuela  State elections 
Constitution of 1999, art. 64 
2001 Brazil  All elections 
Treaty Brazil-Portugal 2000, 
Decree 3.927 of September 
2001. Only Portuguese 
immigrants.  
2001 Bolivia President and Vice-president 
Constitutional reform of 2001. 
President, Vice-president and  
National Referendums, 
Constitution 2009 art. 27 
(implemented 2010)  
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2006 Panama President and Vice-president- 
Law 60 of December 2006 
(implemented 2009)  
 
2008 Ecuador  All elections and referendums  
Constitution of 2008, art. 63 
2009 Costa Rica President and Referendums  
Electoral Code art. 187; Law 
8765 of December 2009 
(implemented 2014) 
 
2010 Dominican 
Republic 
Overseas Deputies (7) 
Constitutional reform of 2010 art. 
81(3), Law 136-11 of February 
2011 (implemented 2012) 
 
2011 Argentina  Local communities 
Law of Migrations No. 25871 
Decree 616 of 2010, art. 11 
2011 Paraguay President, Vice-president, 
Senators and Mercosur 
Parliament  
Constitutional referendum of 
2011, art. 120 (implemented 
2013). Only for Paraguayans 
residing in Argentina, Spain, Sao 
Paulo (Brazil) and U.S. 
 
2013 El Salvador President and Vice-president 
Special Law for the exercise of 
the vote from abroad in 
presidential elections, Decree 273 
of February 2013 (implemented 
2014)  
 
2014 Chile President, Referendums, 
Primaries Constitutional Reform 
of 2014 (implemented 2017)  
 
2016 Guatemala President and Vice-president 
Constitutional Court Rule of 
2011 
Electoral Code Reform of 2016 
(to be implemented in 2019) 
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